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Demographic noise has profound effects on evolutionary and population dynamics, as well as
on chemical reaction systems and models of epidemiology. Such noise is intrinsic and due to the
discreteness of the dynamics in finite populations. We here show that similar noise-sustained tra-
jectories arise in game dynamical learning, where the stochasticity has a different origin: agents
sample a finite number of moves of their opponents inbetween adaptation events. The limit of infi-
nite batches results in deterministic modified replicator equations, whereas finite sampling leads to
a stochastic dynamics. The characteristics of these fluctuations can be computed analytically using
methods from statistical physics, and such noise can affect the attractors significantly, leading to
noise-sustained cycling or removing periodic orbits of the standard replicator dynamics.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Ey, 05.40.-a
Intrinsic noise has been seen to have significant ef-
fects on dynamical systems, and may alter their at-
tractors substantially. Noise-sustained oscillations,
generated via an amplification mechanism, are for
example present in models of population dynamics
[1], epidemiology [2] or biochemical reaction systems
[3]. The origin of these fluctuations is the discrete-
ness of the dynamics in finite systems, determinis-
tic descriptions are then no longer appropriate. The
class of systems in which intrinsic noise cannot be ne-
glected includes models of evolutionary dynamics and
game theory, and much current research aims at un-
derstanding the effects of this demographic stochas-
ticity using methods from nonequilibrium statistical
mechanics and the theory of stochastic processes [4].
Here, we will focus on intrinsic noise resulting from
a different origin, and will consider the learning dy-
namics of agents in a game theoretic setting [5]. This
is complementary to more conventional approaches to
game theory concentrating on the characterisation of
equilibrium points [6], or on evolutionary processes
[7]. In the learning scenario one considers a small
number of agents who interact repeatedly in a given
game, and who observe their opponents’ actions and
aim to react by adapting their own strategy profile.
Such dynamical models are of particular importance
for the understanding of experiments in game theory
and behavioral economics, in which human subjects
play a given game repeatedly under controlled condi-
tions [8, 9]. As a key result we show that stochastic-
ity, induced by imperfect sampling of the opponents’
strategy profiles, can result in trajectories quite dif-
ferent from those of deterministic learning, very much
akin to the mechanism by which intrinsic noise in fi-
nite populations affects the trajectories of evolution-
ary systems. While the amount of intrinsic noise in
evolutionary dynamics is determined by the number
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of individuals in the population, our objective here
is to characterise the fluctuations in the learning dy-
namics of two fixed agents. The quantity controlling
the noise strength is the number of observations made
by the agents inbetween adaptation events. Further-
more, in a deterministic setting and depending on the
game, we demonstrate that memory loss can promote
or impede convergence to a Nash equilibrium.
Consider a general symmetric two-player game,
played repeatedly by players X and Y , and assume
there are p pure strategies in this game. The payoff
matrix is given by aij where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}. The
rounds of the repeated interaction will be labeled by
t = 1, 2, ... in the following. In each round player X
plays one pure strategy i(t) ∈ {1, . . . , p}, and player
Y plays j(t) ∈ {1, . . . , p}. The payoff for X is then
ai(t)j(t) and that for Y is aj(t)i(t). If the players play
stochastically, i.e. if they resort to mixed strate-
gies, i(t) and j(t) will be random variables. Assum-
ing that player X carries a (time-dependent) mixed
strategy profile x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xp(t)) and simi-
larly y(t) = (y1(t), . . . , yp(t)) for player Y , a learn-
ing dynamics is then a prescription used to update
these strategy profiles between subsequent rounds of
the game. xi(t) here denotes the probability with
which player X plays pure strategy i ∈ {1, . . . , p} in
round t, and similarly for yj(t). Normalization re-
quires
∑p
i=1 xi(t) =
∑p
j=1 yj(t) = 1.
In order to define a specific learning dynamics, we
follow [9, 10] and assume that each player keeps valu-
ations of each pure strategy, measuring their relative
performance in the past. More precisely, in a situa-
tion without memory loss, the valuation qi(t) player
X has for pure strategy i is the total payoff X would
have obtained, had he/she always played strategy i
up to time t, and given Y ’s actions. The valuation
rj(t) player Y has for j has an analogous meaning.
Following [9, 10] players then use a logit rule
xi(t) =
eΓqi(t)∑
k e
Γqk(t)
, yj(t) =
eΓrj(t)∑
k e
Γrk(t)
. (1)
2Γ ≥ 0 here sets the scale of the score valuations, and
is known as the response sensitivity [9]. While Γ = 0
corresponds to random response, and Γ =∞ to deter-
ministic play, we will here focus on the case in which
0 < Γ < ∞. It is important to distinguish between
two types of randomness in the actual play: as pre-
scribed by (1), the players will generally use mixed
strategies, so that their actions can be stochastic,
even at given strategy valuations. Secondly, the up-
date of the valuations itself will contain some stochas-
ticity as we will detail next. We will here assume that
players update their scores only once every N rounds
of the game, and keep them constant inbetween. This
is known as batch learning in computer science [12].
Specifically, we will assume
qk(t+N) = (1− λ)qk(t) + 1
N
t+N−1∑
t′=t
akj(t′)
rk(t+N) = (1− λ)rk(t) + 1
N
t+N−1∑
t′=t
aki(t′), (2)
and qk(t+ τ) = qk(t) for all τ = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, and
similarly for player Y . On-line learning [12], i.e. up-
dating after each round, is recovered for N = 1. In
our model all {qi, rj} are updated at each adaptation
event. This corresponds to reinforcement learning
in which foregone payoffs are known and reinforced,
equivalent to weighted fictitious play belief learning,
see Ho et al. [9]. The interpretation of these update
rules is understood best by first considering the case
λ = 0: then the increment of qk between time-steps t
and t + N is given by N−1
∑t+N−1
t′=t akj(t′). This in-
crement is recognized as the average payoff X would
have received per round had he/she played pure strat-
egy k in all rounds t, t+1, . . . , t+N − 1. A non-zero
value, λ ∈ (0, 1], accounts for memory loss. We here
note that other approaches can be taken to describe
memory-loss, for example one may introduce a pre-
factor λ in the payoff terms in Eq. (2). In this paper
we follow the setup of [10].
The update rules are intrinsically stochastic, we
will refer to (1,2) as discrete-time stochastic learning
(DTSL). After a re-scaling of time, and for large, but
finite batch size N we can write
qk(ℓ+ 1) = (1− λ)qk(ℓ) +
∑
j
akjyj(ℓ) +
ξk(ℓ)√
N
rk(ℓ+ 1) = (1− λ)rk(ℓ) +
∑
i
akixi(ℓ) +
ηk(ℓ)√
N
,(3)
where we approximate the noise variables ξk, ηk as
Gaussian random variables. This amounts to an ex-
pansion in N−1/2, and within this approximation the
covariances of the ξk, ηk can be obtained, as we will
report elsewhere [14]. In the limit of infinite batch
size, N → ∞, the dynamics becomes determinis-
tic, we will refer to this as discrete-time deterministic
learning (DTDL). Assuming Γ≪ 1 a continuous-time
limit [10] leads to the modified replicator equations,
x˙i/xi = Γ
∑
j
aijyj − Γf [x,y] + λ
∑
k
xk ln
xk
xi
y˙j/yj = Γ
∑
i
ajixi − Γf [y,x] + λ
∑
k
yk ln
yk
yj
,(4)
where f [x,y] =
∑
ij aijxiyj, as previously reported
and studied in [10], see also [11]. This system main-
tains the normalisation of probabilities, and is hence
2(p − 1)-dimensional. DTDL gives rise to a discrete
version of (4). For DTSL the map is supplemented
by noise. We will denote fixed-points of the noiseless
map by z∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
p, y
∗
1 , . . . , y
∗
p), they are iden-
tical to the fixed points of (4). We now perform an
expansion about the fixed point in powers of N−1/2,
akin to the expansion first proposed in [13]. Writing
z(ℓ) = z∗ +N−1/2∆(ℓ), one finds
∆(ℓ+ 1) = J∆(ℓ) + ζ(ℓ), (5)
with J the Jacobian at the fixed-point, and where
ζ(ℓ) is Gaussian white noise, with correlations among
its components, which can be worked out analyti-
cally [14]. Eq. (5) is the discrete-time analogue of a
linear Langevin equation, and the starting point for
the analysis of fluctuations about the deterministic
limit. In particular Eq. (5) allows one to compute the
stationary distributions of the components of ∆, as
well as their temporal correlations and power spectra
Pi(ω) =
〈
|∆˜i(ω)|2
〉
, with ∆˜i(ω) the Fourier trans-
form of ∆i(ℓ) [14]. This follows the lines of [1]. Here
we will illustrate the effects noise has on the learning
dynamics using the two examples of the prisoners’
dilemma, and that of the rock-papers-scissors game.
The prisoner’s dilemma describes a problem of mu-
tual cooperation, where two players each face the
choice whether to co-operate (C) or to defect (D). We
will here choose the payoff matrix aCC = 3, aCD =
0, aDC = 5, aDD = 1. The Nash equilibrium, and
fixed-point of the standard replicator dynamics (λ =
0) is defection, and we will in the following discuss
the outcome of the batch and on-line learning dy-
namics with and without memory loss. As seen in
Fig. 1a, the deterministic learning dynamics con-
verges to a fixed-point, a numerical analysis shows
that this fixed-point is symmetric with respect to the
exchange of players (x∗ = y∗). The defection rate of
either player decreases with increasing memory loss
(Fig. 1b). The fixed-point of (4) depends only on
the ratio λ/Γ, and the different curves in Fig. 1b can
be collapsed. The learning dynamics at finite batch
size and λ > 0 yields noisy trajectories fluctuating
about the deterministic mean (Fig. 1c), averaging the
noisy dynamics over independent runs reproduces the
deterministic trajectory (Fig. 1a). In Fig. 2 we ad-
dress the nature of stochastic fluctuations in more de-
tail. While deterministic learning converges towards
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FIG. 1: (Color on-line). Defection rate in the prisoners’
dilemma. (a) Dynamics at Γ = 0.5, λ = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
(top to bottom). Markers are from simulations of DTSL
(N = 10, averaged over 1000 runs, defection rate shown
for one fixed player), lines from DTDL; (b) Defection rate
as a function of the memory-loss rate λ for Γ = 1, 0.5, 0.1
(top to bottom); (c) Single runs of the DTSL dynamics
at N = 10, parameters as in (a).
a mixed strategy fixed point, learning at finite batch
sizes leads to a distribution of mixed strategy vec-
tors as indicated in Fig. 2a. The width of these
distributions scales as N−1/2, and can be obtained
from the theory to great accuracy. Panel 2b demon-
strates that our analytical approach captures spectral
properties of the fluctuations as well, and again near
perfect agreement between theory and simulations is
found. These results show that the expansion in the
inverse batch size is a viable analytical tool for the
characterization of stochastic effects in game dynam-
ical learning, and we will proceed to apply it to a
second matrix game in the following.
Rock-papers-scissors (RPS) is a game with p = 3
strategies and cyclic dominance, as indicated by the
payoff matrix aRS = aSP = aPR = 1, aSR =
aPS = aRP = −1 and aRR = aPP = aSS = 0.
If the system is started from symmetric initial con-
ditions, (xR, xP , xS) = (yR, yP , yS), the continuous-
time replicator dynamics, Eqs. (4) at λ = 0 reduces
to a one-population dynamics, and these have one
neutrally stable fixed-point at x∗R = x
∗
P = x
∗
S = 1/3,
and with closed periodic orbits surrounding it [15].
The quantity H = − ln(xRxPxS) − 3 ln 3 is a con-
stant of motion [15], which vanishes at the neutrally
stable fixed point, and indicates a measure of dis-
tance from this fixed-point. The symmetry between
the two players can be broken as discussed in [10], giv-
ing rise to the possibility of limit cycles and chaotic
motion, which we do not discuss here. We first inves-
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FIG. 2: (Color on-line). Defectors in the prisoners’
dilemma. (a) Distribution of defection rates at Γ = λ =
0.5, N = 1000, 100, 10 from top to bottom at the peak,
(b) Spectrum of fluctuations of defection rate. Symbols
from simulations in both panels, solid lines from theory.
tigate the case without memory loss in Fig. 3. The
discrete-time learning dynamics at infinite and at fi-
nite batch sizes does not proceed along the cycles of
the continuous-time replicator dynamics, but instead
it drifts towards the edges of the strategy simplex.
Fig. 3a shows the distance H from the center. This
distance increases monotonically, so that the learn-
ing dynamics operates mostly at the borders of the
strategy simplex after some transient time. In the de-
terministic case this effect is due to the discreteness
in time of the learning process, the relevant eigen-
values of map at the central fixed point are given by
1− λ± iΓ/√3, so that the fixed point is unstable for
λ < λc(Γ) = 1−
√
1− Γ2/3, and stable for λ > λc. In
the unstable regime fluctuations due to finite batch
sizes enhance the outwards drift.
The differences between the noise-free learning pro-
cess and on-line adaptation for the case λ > λc is
studied in Fig. 4. Here the fixed point of the DTDL
dynamics is stable. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian
J at the fixed point are complex, and hence a reso-
nant amplification of fluctuations is possible similar
to the enhanced demographic fluctuations reported
in [1]. Indeed, Fig. 4 shows that the stochastic learn-
ing dynamics at finite batch size sustains coherent
stochastic oscillations about the deterministic fixed-
point. Their power spectrum can be computed based
on an analysis of Eq. (5). Results are compared with
simulations in Fig. 4d, and as seen the agreement is
excellent, provided the batch size is large enough to
justify the expansion in N−1/2. Fig. 4 shows that
this is the case even for small batch sizes, for other
games this will most likely depend on the number of
strategies available to the players. These phenom-
ena are dynamically similar to those in evolutionary
systems, where a linear scaling of extinction times
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FIG. 3: (Color on-line). Rock-papers-scissors without
memory loss (λ = 0,Γ = 0.1). Main panel shows the
distance H from the center of the simplex versus time.
Solid line is the DTDL dynamics, markers from DTSL
at finite batch size (averages over 1000 runs). The inset
shows the frequency of one of the pure strategies versus
time for DTDL and for one run of DTSL, and illustrates
the drift towards the edges of the strategy simplex.
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FIG. 4: (Color on-line) Rock-papers-scissors at λ =
0.01, Γ = 0.1. (a) Distance H versus time; (b) determin-
istic and stochastic trajectories (N = 10) in the strategy
simplex; (c) probability of playing rock for the same run as
in (b); (d) power spectra of fluctuations for N = 1, 2, 3, 10
compared to theory.
in the system size have been reported for neutrally
stable dynamics [4]. In the learning system there is
no extinction, but escape times from a region around
the fixed point can be measured [14], and a similar
linear scaling in the batch size is found for the neu-
trally stable case λ = λc. In the stable phase escape
is sub-extensive, in the unstable regime escape times
grow faster than linearly in N , very akin to what is
reported in [4].
Fluctuations in finite populations have profound
consequences in evolutionary game theory, and we
have here shown that similar stochastic effects can
be seen in a learning-theoretic scenario. The source
of noise is different from that in evolutionary sys-
tems, and the analogue of finite populations are fi-
nite batches of observations which players make inbe-
tween adaptation events. Our analysis demonstrates
that memory loss can lead the system away from
Nash equilibria and bring about co-operation in so-
cial dilemmas. In cyclic games such as RPS conver-
gence is only possible with sufficient memory loss, the
center of the strategy simplex then becomes a stable
fixed point for deterministic learning. The stochas-
ticity and discreteness in the adaptation dynamics
can affect the asymptotic attractors considerably, and
noise-sustained oscillations can be observed. These
oscillations are induced by an amplification mecha-
nism similar to that observed in population dynamics
[1] and in other biological systems, and may have sig-
nificant amplitudes impeding the convergence to the
Nash equilibrium. We expect this to be the case for
a variety of different games and learning algorithms
[14], with compelling consequences for the learnabil-
ity of games and their Nash equilibria. Determinis-
tic learning of asymmetric games is known to lead
to chaotic motion [10], and we expect that a dy-
namics with imperfect sampling would make it even
less likely that the players collectively retrieve a Nash
equilibrium.
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